











The	 relation	of	 the	Greek	employment	policy	 to	 the	European	one,	as	 it	was	 formulated	
within	EES	and	the	Lisbon	strategy,	was	a	particular	one.	The	Greek	employment	policy	fully	
adopted	 the	 form,	 the	structure	and	 the	discourse	of	 the	EES	but	 it	was	only	marginally	
influenced	by	the	“way	of	doing	things.”	The	compliance	of	the	Greek	employment	policy	with	
the	European	guidelines	for	employment	was	primarily	aimed	at	ensuring	the	precious	flow	






of	 the	 researchers	 of	 the	 Greek	 employment	 policy;	 that	 is	 the	 low	 effectiveness	
diachronically	demonstrated	by	employment	policy	in	Greece,	as	well	as	the	fact	that	
the	implementation	of	the	employment	programmes	in	Greece	is	characterized	to	a	
large	 extent	 by	 “irrational”	 and	 paradoxical	 practices	 which	 often	 result	 in	 the	
annulment	of	the	proclaimed	objectives.		
The	basic	hypothesis	 is	 that	 by	 examining	 the	Greek	 employment	policy	 in	












the	 employment	 policy,	 and,	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 European	 Employment	 Strategy	
(EES)	which	determined	the	form	of	the	Greek	employment	policy.		






(for	 further	 see	 Ioannidis	 2012).	 The	 special	 feature	 of	 EES	 is	 that	 it	 adopted	 the	
“need”	for	labour	market	flexibility,	but	at	the	same	time	it	altered	it	by	introducing	
the	 rationale	 of	 a	 “regulated	deregulation”	 (Ioannidis	 2011).	 The	 emphasis	 on	 the	
participation	of	 the	social	partners,	 the	 introduction	of	 the	dimension	of	quality	 in	
employment,	the	policies	for	combating	social	exclusion,	the	reference	to	the	workers	
in	 poverty,	 the	 policies	 concerning	 gender	 equality	 etc.	 constitute	 some	 of	 these	
differentiations. 
According	 to	 the	 European	 Commission	 web‐site1,	 the	 EES	 aims	 at	
strengthening	the	coordination	of	national	employment	policies	by	involving	Member	
States	in	a	series	of	common	objectives	and	targets.	Moreover,	the	EES	established	a	
multilateral	 surveillance	 framework,	 notably	 the	 Joint	 annual	 report	 on	
employment/Joint	employment	report	and	the	Employment	Guidelines	proposed	by	
the	Commission	and	adopted	by	the	EU	Council.	These	documents	form	the	basis	for	
the	 National	 Action	 Plans	 (NAPs)	 prepared	 by	 the	 Member	 States,	 and	
recommendations	of	the	Council	of	Ministers	to	the	different	Member	States. 









The	 OMC	 has	 managed	 to	 produce	 some	 results,	 due	 to	 the	 open	 nature	 of	
coordination	in	a	field	(employment	and	social	policy),	where	the	divergences	among	
the	Member	States	are	still	large.	However,	its	main	usefulness	is	to	be	found	on	the	




considered	 complementary	 rather	 than	 controversial.	 Barbier’s	 (2004)	 approach	
concentrates	on	 the	 changes	 that	 the	EES	brought	 about	 in	 the	national	 discourse	









Porte	 and	 Pochet	 2002).	 The	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 Active	 Labour	 Market	 Policies	
(ALMP)	are	developed,	constitutes	an	additional	factor.	Countries	that	are	closer	to	



















6).	 Finally,	 the	 EES	 had	 positive	 effects	 especially	 on	 mainstreaming	 the	 gender	





compliance	with	 the	 EU	 requirements	 to	 the	 differentiation	 of	 the	 discourse	 used	
according	 to	 the	 audience.	 In	 that	 sense,	 there	 is	 a	 wide	 consensus	 among	 the	










3. An  estimation  on  the  dependence  of  the  Greek  employment  policy 
concerning the European funds 










Decisions	 on	 employment	 programmes	 and	 from	 reports	 produced	 for	 the	 CSF	
(evaluations,	progress	reports,	updates,	etc.)	it	is	possible	to	reach	a	rough	estimation. 

















































1989  96.285,5  96.285,6  25.913,9  25.913,9  ‐  53.745,5  16.626,1  39.914,0   7.846,0  30,3%  30,3% 
1990  112.887,0  112.887,0  28.923,6  28.923,6  ‐  65.081,0  18.882,4  56.369,0  ‐  n.a.  n.a. 
1991  168.782,0  187.932,0  51.060,8  51.060,8  ‐  107.477,5  29.393,7  63.505,0  33.615,0  65,8%  65,8% 
1992  209.239,0  239.897,0  67.069,9  67.069,9  ‐  136.558,8  36.268,3  69.972,0  39.605,0  59,1%  59,1% 
1993  234.094,0  234.094,0  72.701,1  72.701,1  ‐  126.674,4  34.718,6  109.394,0  43.383,4  59,7%  59,7% 
1994  263.080,1  263.080,1  70.466,0  70.466,0  ‐  150.170,0  42.444,1  131.300,0  48.728,3  69,2%  69,2% 
1995  296.534,8  296.534,8  92.971,6  64.041,6  28.930,0  153.248,5  50.314,7  66.500,0  39.500,0  61,7%  42,5% 
1996  319.419,3  301.149,3  100.368,3  69.123,9  31.244,4  153.636,8  47.144,2  69.100,0  40.000,0  57,9%  39,9% 
1997  358.525,5  399.927,3  128.307,9  95.508,6  32.799,3  218.539,1  53.080,3  89.500,0  40.000,0  41,9%  31,2% 
1998  377.902,9  377.750,0  136.632,8  102.321.0  34.311,8  185.638,5  55.478,7  128.500,0  45.000,0  44,0%  32,9% 
1999  430.134,9  394.400,0  147.736,9  111.250,9  36.486,0  180.462,0  66.201,1  211.265,0  60.000,0  53,9%  40,6% 
2000  1.502,1  1.395,0  586,7  468,6  118,1  570,9  237,3  679,0  290,8  62,0%  49,6% 
2001  1.422,2  1.404,8  564,4  427,4  137,0  615,8  224,6  248,0  68,5  16,0%  12,1% 
2002  1.660,3  1.547,8  630,3  450,9  179,4  689,0  228,6  361,0  386,3  85,7%  61,3% 
2003  1.894,7  1.652,2  696,9  525,6  171,3  686,8  268,5  584,0  220,0  41,9%  31,6% 
2004  2.132,1  2.088,3  747,4  556,3  191,1  937,2  403,7  640,0  431,5  77,6%  57,7% 
2005  2.258,8  2.129,8  836,3  630,6  205,7  939,7  353,9  576,0  425,6  67,5%  50,9% 







It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 according	 to	 other	 sources	 of	 data	 the	 above	 mentioned	
numbers	 underestimate	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 European	 funds.	 For	 example,	
according	to	OAED’s	1988	Budget	(p.	13)	the	European	funds	covered	about	55%	of	
the	total	expenditure	on	employment	programmes.	In	our	estimation	the	figure	for	
that	 year	 is	 only	 31%.	 Secondly,	 according	 to	 OAED	 the	 funds	 from	 the	 1st	 CSF	
accounted	 for	 almost	 73%	 of	 the	 total	 ALMP	 expenditure	 (OAED	 1994:	 53).	 Our	













the	 ESF	 and	 are	 not	 implemented	 solely	 from	OAED.	 For	 example,	 labour	market	
innervations	like	entrepreneurship	supported	in	rural	areas	had	been	funded	from	




Analogous	 problems	 arise	 in	 the	 estimation	 of	 the	 employment	 outcomes	
(beneficiaries	&	job	creation)	of	the	co‐financed	employment	programmes.	The	data	
presented	in	Table	3	is	extracted	from	various	Greek	official	documents	and	reports	
of	 the	E.U.	 (see	also	Table	8	 to	Table	11	 in	 the	annex).	Nonetheless,	 these	numbers	
should	be	treated	cautiously	since	the	methodology	under	which	these	numbers	have	
been	calculated	by	the	Greek	authorities,	remains	unknown.	Moreover,	what	is	also	





2009	 on	 employment	 programmes	 including	 some	 type	 of	 action	 on	 direct	






















1982  21.194  20.000  ‐  ‐  1.194  3.491.300  ‐38.000 
1983  28.764  25.000  ‐  ‐  3.764  3.532.127  40.827 
1984  16.575  14.000  ‐  ‐  2.575  3.549.359  17.232 
1985  21.751  15.000  ‐  ‐  6.751  3.581.856  32.497 
1986  27.318  19.500  1.100  ‐  6.718  3.597.613  15.757 
1987  29.378  18.700  5.409  ‐  5.269  3.595.474  ‐2.139 
1988  44.873  29.900  5.120  ‐  9.853  3.654.837  59.363 
1989  40.347  29.700  6.793  ‐  3.854  3.667.431  12.594 
1990  34.077  24.138  7.748  ‐  2.191  3.716.732  49.301 
1991  21.533  16.000  5.533  ‐  ‐  3.630.857  ‐85.875 
1992  16.840  12.000  4.840  ‐  ‐  3.683.038  52.181 
1993  17.823  14.000  3.823  ‐  ‐  3.715.363  32.325 
1994  36.383  28.700  7.683  ‐  ‐  3.786.157  70.794 
1995  51.350  40.900  10.450  ‐  ‐  3.820.510  34.353 
1996  72.600  58.000  14.600  ‐  ‐  3.868.283  47.773 
1997  60.000  44.700  15.300  ‐  ‐  3.853.335  ‐14.948 
1998  25.820  18.020  7.800  ‐  ‐  4.023.676  170.341 
1999  86.997  48.634  12.903  22.500  2.960  4.040.371  16.695 
2000  134.176  85.349  18.540  20.000  10.287  4.097.875  57.504 
2001  35.688  6.282  2.182  23.000  4.224  4.103.211  5.336 
2002  39.623  6.699  2.460  25.000  5.464  4.190.175  86.964 
2003  65.083  30.000  ‐  30.000  5.083  4.286.561  96.386 
2004  22.200  13.000  4.500  4.700  ‐  4.330.497  43.936 
2005  51.903  30.500  4.900  16.503  ‐  4.381.936  51.439 
2006  44.160  14.171  5.182  24.691  116  4.452.817  70.881 
2007  47.530  18.156  6.100  22.370  904  4.519.854  67.037 
2008  38.809  22.741  4.718  10.436  914  4.582.544  62.690 






































who	are	entitled	 to	 it.	Τhe	eligibility	criteria	 for	 the	unemployment	benefit	 targets	
only	those	who	have	been	regularly	employed	in	the	past	for	a	relatively	long	period	
of	 time	 (Papadopoulos	 2006).	 Consequently,	 the	 most	 populous	 groups	 of	 the	
unemployed	―namely	(a)	the	young	unemployed	with	no	work	experience	who	have	
not	 yet	 established	 the	 right	 to	 the	 unemployment	 benefit	 and	 (b)	 the	 long‐term	
unemployed	 who	 have	 exhausted	 the	 maximum	 time	 period	 of	 its	 granting―	 are	






The	 minimum	 protection	 offered	 to	 the	 unemployed	 combined	 with	 the	
government's	 unwillingness	 –due	 to	 the	 significant	 budgetary	 cost–	 to	 extend	 the	
9	
	
coverage	 rate	 of	 the	 unemployment	 benefit,	 created	 a	 strong	 incentive	 to	 develop	





benefit.	 A	 substitute	 that	 is	 financed	 by	 community	 resources	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	
unemployment	benefit	that	is	funded	by	national	resources.	The	vocational	training	
policy	 ―essentially	 an	 active	 labour	 market	 policy―	 was	 virtually	 “passivitised”.	
Eventually,	 this	 practice	 resulted	 in	 “recycling”	 a	 great	 number	 of	 unemployed‐
trainees	 in	 the	 same	 or	 in	 different	 programmes―a	 practice	 of	 which	 the	 Greek	
Manpower	 Employment	 Organization	 (OAED)	 was	 well	 aware	 of	 (interview	 with	

























important	 was	 the	 bypassing	 of	 the	 ASEP	 (Supreme	 Council	 for	 Civil	 Personnel	



















mechanism	 grew	 gigantically	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 New	 Democracy	 administration.	
During	1999‐2008,	184.000	stage	 job	vacancies	were	created	(Table	4);	57%	were	
placed	in	institutions	of	the	public	sector,	in	Local	and	Regional	Authorities	(OTA)	and	
Public	 controlled	 Social	 Security	 Organisations;	 16%	 were	 placed	 in	 private	
companies	and	29%	were	placed	both	in	the	private	and	the	public	sector,	the	vast	











Organisation	 (OAED)	 employed	 in	 its	 services	 as	 stagiers	 at	 least	 3,000	 people,	 a	
number	equal	to	25%	of	its	personnel.	Additionally,	out	of	86.000	stage	vacancies	that	




the	 stagiers	 did	 not	 decrease.	 The	 political	 benefits	 were	 so	 extensive	 that	 the	












































Total  30  46%  35  54%  65   
1999‐2005  14  64%  8  36%  22   
2006‐2009  16  37%  27  63%  43   
Time‐period  Num. of postings  %  Num. of postings  % 
Num. of 
postings  % 
Total  93,785  62%  56,988  38%  150,773   
1999‐2005  76,823  87%  11,463  13%  88,286   






the	Greek	employment	policy,	a	paradox	which	 lies	 in	 the	simultaneous	validity	of	
three	conditions:	a)	the	expenditure	of	the	ALMP	in	Greece	as	a	percentage	of	GDP	
























In	 short,	 the	 extensive	 employment	 subsidies	 constituted	 a	mechanism	 for	
decreasing	the	labour	cost	especially	in	small	and	medium	enterprises,	which	were	
the	main	users	of	these	programmes.	This	mechanism	was	part	of	an	informal	strategy	
implemented	 in	 order	 to	 preserve	 the	 competitiveness	 of	 these	 companies,	which	
otherwise	would	have	suffered	by	the	liberalization	of	economy	and	its	opening	up	to	
international	 competition.	 This	 is	 the	 key	 to	 explaining	 the	 ineffectiveness	 of	 the	
employment	programmes.	On	the	one	hand,	 these	programmes	were	 ineffective	 in	
answering	 the	 needs	 of	 the	 unemployed.	 However,	 they	 were	 exceptionally	
“effective,”	when	it	came	to	decreasing	the	labour	cost	in	the	less	competitive	small	
and	medium	companies.	 
That	 explains	 the	 fact	 that	 although	 for	 28	 years	 the	 shortage	 of	 statistical	
monitoring	 and	 evaluation	 had	 been	 noted	 by	 all	 the	 institutions	 involved	 (both	
national	and	European),	no	real	effort	has	been	made	to	confront	the	problem.	The	
bottom	line,	however,	is	that	the	lame	statistical	monitoring	allowed	the	unobstructed	





















From	 1989	 to	 1996	 there	 was	 a	 significant	 increase	 in	 the	 funding	 of	
vocational	 training	programmes.	Namely,	 the	 vocational	 training	 expenditure	 rose	
from	0.04%	of	GDP	in	1987	to	0.24%	in	1990.	This	rise	can	also	be	detected	in	the	
number	 of	 trainees	 that	 increased	 from	 360.000	 during	 the	 first	 CSF	 to	 550.000	
during	the	second	one	(OAED	1994:	56,	Vretakou	&	Rouseas	2002:	34).	Nevertheless,	
in	spite	this	unprecedented	increase	in	the	funding	and	in	the	number	of	trainees	no	
systematic	 effort	 was	made	 to	 create	 an	 official	 register	 of	 the	 institutes/centers	
implementing	 these	 programmes.	 Actually,	 the	 legislative	 framework	 made	 no	
provision	at	all	for	the	basic	requirements	on	infrastructure,	training	equipment	or	
human	 resources	 (Karalis	 2003:	 16).	 As	 an	 outcome	 even	 sport	 clubs	 and	 Holy	
Metropolises	implemented	vocational	training	programmes	within	the	framework	of	
the	 first	 CSF	 (General	 Secretariat	 for	 the	 Management	 of	 Community	 and	 Other	
Resources	 2007:	 28).	 However,	 this	 did	 not	 generate	 any	 problem	 at	 all	 in	 the	
absorbency	of	the	EU	funds.	On	the	contrary,	the	relevant	Operational	Programme	of	





number	of	 these	“institutes”	 is	unknown	and	 fluctuates	 from	3.500	(Economic	and	
Social	Committee	of	Greece	1988:	2)	to	1.200	(Papadeodosiou	and	Stavrou	1993:	42).	
The	bottom	line	is	that	the	first	two	CSFs	created	a	demand	for	vocational	training	
services,	which	 the	private	 companies	hasted	 to	 satisfy	either	autonomously	or	as	
subcontractors.	 At	 this	 stage,	 the	 “poor	 organisation”	 of	 the	 monitoring	 system	
contained	an	underemphasized	“consistency.”	The	absence	of	any	control	resulted	in	
the	waste	of	resources,	but	at	the	same	time	it	allowed	the	emergence	of	a	“critical	














man	 training	 “centres”.	 The	 certification	 process	 was	 carried	 out	 by	 a	 4‐person	
committee	with	no	administrative	support	and	no	mechanism	of	checking	the	validity	
of	 the	 dossiers	 submitted	 by	 the	 vocational	 centres.	 In	 practice,	 the	 1994’s	
certification	targets	limited	themselves	in	excluding	only	the	virtual	companies.	At	the	
end	of	the	process	481	Vocational	Training	Centers	(KEK)	in	total	–332	private	ones–	
where	certified.	Even	so,	 the	 inability	 to	check	“beyond	the	paper”	permitted	even	




In	 1997	 a	 new	 certification	 round	 was	 launched	 with	 new	 criteria	 and	
processes.	The	new	criteria	prevented	at	least	half	of	the	481	prior	certified	KEK	to	
apply.	 In	 total,	 296	dossiers	were	 submitted	out	of	which	262	passed	 successfully	





the	proprietors	of	 the	 institutions	 for	the	 investments	they	had	made.	At	 the	same	
time,	only	during	the	period	1994‐1996,	more	than	200.000	people	participated	in	
vocational	 training	 programmes,	 out	 of	 which	 80.000	 were	 trained	 in	 private	
vocational	centres	(Karantinos	et.	al.	1997:	36).	In	practice,	this	meant	100%	capacity	
utilization	of	the	private	training	centres	for	at	least	two	years	given	that	after	1997’s	













sub‐offices,	 the	 thematic	 areas	 and	 the	 legal	 form	 of	 the	 vocational	 centres	 were	
canceled.	Nonetheless,	the	government	retained	a	significant	tool	in	order	to	promote	
its	 targets	according	 to	 the	number	and	 the	size	of	 the	KEKs;	 the	allocation	of	 the	
training	programmes	among	the	KEKs.	It	was	only	after	2010	that	this	tool	was	to	be	









2007‐2009,	 just	28%	of	 the	programmes	targeted	at	 the	unemployed	compared	to	
40%	 of	 the	 programmes	 in	 the	 time	 period	 2003‐2005)	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
potential	worker‐trainees	can	be	easily	tracked	down;	on	the	contrary,	in	the	case	of	
the	unemployed,	the	vocational	centres	should	track	down	the	unemployed,	organise	





















of	 the	 Greek	 public	 administration.	 Respectively,	 the	 attempts	 to	 rationalise	 the	




well	 as,	 the	 latent	 rationality	 of	 the	 increased	 intervention	 after	 1997.	 From	 the	
government’s	point	of	view,	the	political	benefits	of	giving	out	money	without	specific	
criteria	 are	more	 than	 obvious	 and	 they	 need	 not	 to	 be	 further	 explained.	 But,	 it	
should	be	noted	that	the	most	important	benefit	for	the	state,	was	that	it	managed	to	
partly	deal	with	 the	 insufficiency	of	 the	unemployment	benefit	which	excludes	 the	




lack	 of	 evaluation	 and	 certification	 criteria	 provided	 a	 temporary	 flexibility	 that	
allowed	higher	rates	of	EU	funding	absorption.	 
















earners	 from	 50%	 of	 the	 total	 employment	 in	 the	 early	 80’s	 to	 65%	 in	 2008.	
Nonetheless,	the	established	business	culture	did	not	allow	any	room	for	alternative	
strategies	 regarding	 profit‐making,	 other	 than	 the	 squeezing	 of	 the	 labour	 cost	
(Ioakeimoglou	 2011).	 At	 this	 very	 point,	 the	 first	 tension/	 contradiction	 can	 be	
observed.	At	the	time	when	the	real	wages	were	increasing	as	a	result	of	the	economic	




This	 political	 economy	 can	 be	 approached	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 three	 types	 of	
interventions:	recruiting	subsidy	programmes,	Stage	programmes	and	the	vocational	




























the	 strengthening	 of	 the	 legislative	 framework	 on	 gender	 equality	 can	 be	 directly	
attributed	 to	 the	 European	 influence	 although,	 as	 Yiannakourou	 (2003,	 63‐64)	
mentions,	 in	 many	 cases	 the	 government	 just	 replicated	 the	 European	 Directives	






attributed	 to	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 EES	 (Yiannakourou	 2003:	 63)	 while	 the	 vocational	
training	 policy	 has	 been	 developed	 almost	 exclusively	 due	 to	 EU	 pressures	
(Ioakimidis	2000:	298).	 




aiming	at	a	 "Confidence	Pact"	among	 the	Unions,	 the	employers	and	 the	State.	The	
connection	with	Delor’s	White	Paper	on	Competitiveness,	Growth	and	Employment	
and	the	European	Confidence	Pact	is	obvious.	Other	key	concepts	of	ESS	also	gained	
special	 weight	 in	 the	 discourse	 of	 employment	 policy:	 competitiveness,	
entrepreneurship	 and	 equal	 opportunities	 were	 core	 components	 of	 PASOK	
modernizing	discourse	of	 the	period	1996‐2004.	The	political	affinity	between	 the	




when	maintaining	 that	 the	 influence	 of	 EES	 on	 the	 Greek	 employment	 policy	was	
20	
	








However,	all	 the	above‐mentioned	developments	 represent	 just	one	side	of	
the	 coin.	 The	 same	 researchers	 certify	 that	 the	 learning	 aspect	 was	 particularly	
limited	 in	 the	 case	of	Greece	 (Nakos	2005,	Kazakos	2010),	 the	 involvement	of	 the	
social	dialogue	institutions	in	the	actual	production	of	employment	policies	remained	
marginal	 (Yiannakourou	 2003,	 Tsarouhas	 2008),	 the	 National	 Action	 Plans	 for	
Employment	look	more	like	lists	of	policies	where	the	implemented	programmes	are	
registered,	 the	participation	of	 the	Social	Partners	remained	only	 in	paper	and	the	
way	 that	policies	where	 implemented	did	not	change	 that	much	(Tsarouhas	2008:	











the	 EES;	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 though,	 the	 way	 this	 policy	 was	 implemented	 was	







The	 Greek	 employment	 policy	 –despite	 being	 influenced	 by	 the	 EES―	was	
implemented	in	such	a	way	that	would	serve	the	internal	priorities	of	the	country.	In	




can	 be	 interpreted	 accordingly.	 The	 need	 to	 maximize	 the	 flow	 of	 the	 European	
resources	 made	 the	 Greek	 government	 “flexible”	 as	 to	 the	 exact	 content	 of	 the	
employment	 policy	 itself.	 So,	 the	 Greek	 governments	 adhered	 consistently	 to	 a	
strategy	 bearing	 two	 fundamental	 features;	 support	 of	 any	 proposal	 aiming	 at	
promoting	a	European	dimension/funding	on	employment	policy,	but	also	systematic	


























 Current, prizes, 1981‐1999 in bil. of Drachmas, from 2000 on in €  As % of GDP  Current, prizes, 1981‐1999 in bil. of Drachmas, from 2000 on in € 
1981  2.050,1  9,1 0,4% ‐ ‐  ‐  ‐
1982  2.574,7  40,6 1,6% 1,5 4,5  46,4  6,8
1983  3.079,2  73,4 2,4% 2,2 5,8  71,8  13,1
1984  3.805,7  83,7 2,2% 3,2 6,1  88,1  15,0
1985  4.617,8  122,6 2,7% 8,0 12,0  111,2  15,8
1986  5.514,8  182,1 3,3% 10,2 50,5  205,2  7,7
1987  6.271,9  244,3 3,9% 20,4 47,1  218,1  33,4
1988  9.169,0  259,9 2,8% 26,6 49,0  240,2  32,9
1989  10.895,2  353,5 3,2% 39,9 84,7  323,9  13,3
average 1981‐1989  47.978,3  1.369,2 2,9% 112,1 259,8  1.304,8  137,9
1990  13.143,1  474,8 3,6% 56,4 94,3  418,3  26,7
1991  16.230,5  605,9 3,7% 63,5 142,6  536,2  45,1
1992  18.766,1  815,6 4,3% 70,0 252,0  627,7  64,0
1993  21.135,7  1.053,4 5,0% 109,4 322,0  832,8  62,3
1994  23.983,6  1.113,9 4,6% 131,3 326,2  903,8  58,0
1995  27.235,2  1.094,3 4,0% 66,5 432,6  844,1  63,8
1996  29.935,1  1.414,5 4,7% 69,1 571,5  885,1  148,6
1997  33.132,7  1.296,5 3,9% 89,5 475,1  943,7  163,4
1998  36.042,2  1.377,0 3,8% 128,5 605,3  922,6  175,8
1999  38.447,0  1.547,3 4,0% 211,3 253,2  947,6  169,7
average 1990‐1999  258.051,2  10.793,3 4,2% 995,4 3.474,9  7.862,0  977,4
2000  136,3  4,60 3,4% 0,68 1,94  2,90  0,49
2001  146,3  4,03 2,8% 0,25 1,78  2,78  0,62
2002  157,6  3,88 2,5% 0,36 1,60  2,73  0,62
2003  171,3  3,06 1,8% 0,58 0,95  2,90  0,18
2004  185,2  3,62 2,0% 0,64 1,52  3,03  0,45
2005  198,6  3,23 1,6% 0,58 1,34  3,13  0,41
2006  214,0  4,56 2,1% 0,55 2,15  3,45  0,58
2007  229,4  4,01 1,7% 0,78 3,07  2,96  0,46
2008  245,5  4,83 2,0% 0,99 2,86  3,22  0,41
average 2000‐2008  1.684,1  35,8 2,1% 5,4 17,2  27,1  4,2
	
Table 8: Number of beneficiaries (persons) through the ESF funded programs in Greece (1984‐1988) 
  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988 
ESF beneficiaries by type of operation* 
Vocational Training  156.905 199.392 123.201  196.519 :
Vocational guidance  1.297 804 :  325 :
Hiring subsidies  12.720 35.595 62.413  84.056 :
Wage subsidies  4.992  12.923  1.245  :  : 
Relocation subsidies  19.080 23.739 21.470  9.304 :
Social integration  3.300 7.300 7.483  : :
Technical help  707 20 20  94 :
Other measures   69 : 567  : :
Total  199.001 279.773 217.298  263.279 299.147
Basic labour market data** 
Total employment  3.395.139  3.442.319  3.450.487  3.460.851  3.395.139 
Net employment in comparison with the previous year  37.307 47.180 8.168  10.364 61.580
Unemployed  312.974 302.500 285.653  284.831 302.234
Percentage of subsided jobs on the net employment  34% 75% 764%  811%

































































minimum  maximum  minimum  maximum 
In Drachmas 
1982*  885  20  40  165  330 
1983*  984  25  55  246  541 
1984  1.202  33,2  66,5  400  800 
1985  1.314  45,6  100  600  1.350 
1986  1.618  49,4  92,7  800  1.500 
1987  1.789  44,7  83,8  800  1.500 
1988  2.074  48,2  86,8  1.000  1.800 
1989  2.459  40,7  69,1  1.000  1.700 
1990  2.911  51,5  72,1  1.500  2.100 
1991  3.315  54,3  69,4  1.800  2.300 
1992  3.839  52,1  70,3  2.000  2.700 
1993  4.411  49,9  63,5  2.200  2.800 
1994  4.934  44,6  81,1  2.200  4.000 
1995  5.344  46,8  93,6  2.500  5.000 
1996  5.753  52,1  86,9  3.000  5.000 
1997  6.059  41,3  90,8  2.500  5.500 
1998  6.364  62,8  4.000  4.000 
2000  6.988  57,2  100,1  4.000  7.000 
2001  7.114  98,3  7.000  7.000 
In Euro 
2002  22,3  65,9    14,7   
2004  25,21  55,5  100,1  14  26 
2005  26,41  30,2  70,1  8  18,5 
2006  27,18         
2007  29,39         


































































  1981  1983  1985  1987  1989  1991  1993  1995  1997  1999  2001  2003  2005  2007 
Austria  29  25  29  28  29 31 27 33 32 33 32  32  32  32
Belgium  45  44  43  43  42 42 40 39 40 39 38  42  41  40
Denmark  54  56  53  49  52 52 51 65 62 61 51  50  50  48
Finland  24  25  34  36  34 39 38 36 34 34 35  36  35  34
France  31  31  34  38  37 38 38 37 37 37 44  39  39  39
Germany  29  29  28  28  28 29 28 26 26 27 29  29  24  24
Greece  6  6 7  8  7 13 13 15 16 17 13  13  13  13
Hungary  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 13  13  13  13
Island  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 41  43  45  33
Ireland  28  32  28  30  27 29 31 26 29 29 30  32  34  37
Italy  1  1 0  0  3 3 17 19 18 34 34  34  33  32
Luxembourg  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 27  27  27  27
Netherlands  48  47  55  57  55 53 53 52 52 52 53  53  35  34
Norway  29  29  39  39  39 39 39 39 39 41 43  34  34  34
Poland  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 11  12  11  10
Portugal  9  7 22  31  32 34 35 35 35 45 41  40  40  43
Spain  28  28  34  34  34 34 32 39 39 38 36  36  36  36
Sweden  25  28  28  30  29 29 28 27 27 24 37  41  39  32
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